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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the form of the legislative institution - citizen assembly versus
elected parliament - a¤ects the level and composition of local public expenditure. Our empirical
analysis focuses on medium-sized and mostly German-speaking communes in Switzerland that
switched from assembly to parliament between 1945 and 2010. Event study estimates suggest that
parliament adoption increases total spending by about 6 percent and that this increase is driven
mostly by general administration and education spending. To understand potential mechanisms at
play, we run a survey among assembly participants and document a sizeable under-representation
of 20- to 40-year-olds, as well as of women in assemblies compared to both voters in elections and
to the electorate at large. Since these two demographics have relatively strong preferences for
public spending on education in our setting, switching from citizen assembly to parliament likely
increased their representation in the political process.
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1 Introduction
Whether the form of the legislative institution at the local level matters for collective choices is
an open and important question. Citizen assemblies (also called town meetings) are the form
of government in which ordinary citizens gather to legislate and decide budget priorities. Local
parliaments, on the other hand, are characterized by principals (citizens) delegating decision-
making power to their agents (politicians). This may create well-known agency problems, where
politicians pursue their own interests instead of maximizing the principalswelfare (e.g. Persson
and Tabellini, 2000; Besley, 2006). In order to improve governance, the World Bank and several
aid-organizations have been actively promoting citizen participation in local budgeting decisions
for several decades (e.g. World Bank, 1996). Similarly, Bryan (2004) praises the virtues of town
meetings in New England. Both legislative forms are prevalent around the world today after a
surge of participatory democracy in several developing countries such as Brazil, Venezuela and
India.
While citizen assemblies seem appealing because of their deliberative character and the lack
of agency problems, (Ban et al., 2012; Wantchekon et al., forthcoming), one potential worry is
about unequal participation and representation (Lijphart, 1997). Because attending assembly
meetings is time-consuming, theory predicts potentially low and non-representative participation
in assembly democracies (Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner, 2000). Voting in elections on the
other hand only requires a trip to the ballot box once every four years or so. Policies may
therefore di¤er across legislative institutions simply because median voters di¤er. While there is a
sizeable literature on how direct democratic instruments (voter initiative and budget referendum)
within representative systems a¤ect policy, to date very little is known about the causal e¤ect
of assembly versus representative legislative forms on collective decisions (see Tyrefors-Hinnerich
and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014, for a notable exception).
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This paper provides some of the rst evidence on the e¤ects of legislative form on the level and
composition of public expenditure. The setting is one of a mature federal system (Switzerland),
composed of cantons (states) and communes, where representative and assembly democracy coexist
at the commune level. Our analysis focuses on cantons where communes have the authority to
determine the form of their legislative power. To get information on the communes current and
past legislative forms, we sent our own "legislative survey" to all communes in these cantons.
Based on our survey, canton-level administrative data and prior surveys on local governance, we
identied a "switcher sample" - 77 communes that changed the form of their legislative institution
at least once between 1945 and 2010, most of them abolishing the assembly and introducing a
parliament. The most common reasons for the switch were low participation in assemblies, space
problems due to population growth and women su¤rage, and the desire to professionalize the
legislative process. We focus on such switcher communes because communes that always had an
assembly or a parliament are likely di¤erent from each other in partly unobservable dimensions.
We did our own data collection in local archives of switcher communes in order to recover historical
public expenditure information.
Our event study in the switcher sample suggests that adopting a parliament increases total
spending per capita by about 6 percent.1 The overall spending increase is mostly driven by admin-
istrative and education spending. For other spending categories, such as welfare, law enforcement,
and tra¢ c and environment, we nd typically smaller and statistically insignicant e¤ects. The
causal interpretation of these estimates hinges on the assumption that time-varying unobservables
are uncorrelated with parliament adoption within communes over time. Although this assumption
is not directly testable, we show that results are robust to including time-varying controls for
demographic composition, as well as major determinants of parliament adoption (population and
1We also conducted a fuzzy regression discontinuity analysis in canton Vaud that turned out to be under-powered.
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local women su¤rage). Introducing a commune-specic time trend leaves our results una¤ected or
increases the size of estimated impacts. Perhaps the most important validation comes from the
event study graph: pre-adoption e¤ects are small and insignicant, while the post-adoption period
is marked by a sharp and persistent increase of e¤ect size estimates.2
The positive impact of representative democracy on administrative spending is consistent with
rent-extraction. Representative democracies are subject to a principal-agent problem, and elected
politicians may deviate from voter preferences in order to pursue their own interests (e.g. Persson
and Tabellini, 2000; Besley, 2006). An alternative plausible explanation is that newly paid salaries
for members of parliament and their sta¤ mechanically increased administrative spending. The
positive impact on education spending suggests that preferences for this type of spending were
systematically under-represented in the assembly system, which is consistent with predicted low
and potentially non-representative assembly turnout due to participation costs (Osborne, Rosen-
thal and Turner, 2000). Voting costs for Swiss elections in contrast are particularly low because
many cantons introduced postal voting over the course of our study period (Funk, 2010).
To better understand the socio-demographic characteristics of the median voter in assemblies
and elections, we also conducted an "assembly survey" investigating assembly participantsgender,
age, education, family status and working hours in communes of canton Zürich. Results suggest
a sizeable under-representation of 20- to 40-year-olds as well as of women in assemblies compared
to both election participants and to the electorate at large. We corroborate these results using a
nation-wide survey of commune secretaries who were asked about the representation of di¤erent
groups at assembly meetings.
Since these two sources document an under-representation of women and relatively young
citizens in assemblies (relative to elections), it is key to understand whether and how these groups
2While the switch from assembly to parliament leads to a higher likelihood of introducing referendum rights for
citizens on average, impacts on spending composition are present even when the switch in legislative form involved
no change of referendum rights.
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di¤er from male and older citizens in terms of policy preferences. Results from a recent post-
election survey (SELECTS, 2011) that explicitly asked about policy preferences suggest that Swiss
20- to 40-year-olds and women are more strongly in favor of local public childcare provision than
older citizens and men. Similarly, Cattaneo and Wolter (2009) conrm (using another Swiss
survey) that elderly people are less supportive of education spending more generally.3 Switching
from citizen assembly to parliament in our setting therefore seems to increase the representation of
two demographics with relatively strong preferences for public spending on education. At the same
time, relatively young citizens and women are not more favorable to increased spending on welfare
and law enforcement than older citizens and men. Our ndings that parliament adoption increases
spending on education - but not on law enforcement or welfare spending - are thus remarkably
consistent with the evidence on policy preferences of under-represented groups in assemblies.
Our paper most closely relates to Tyrefors-Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) who com-
pare welfare spending under assembly and representative democracy in early 20th century Sweden
after the introduction of universal and equal su¤rage using a regression discontinuity design based
on local population. The main result is that parliaments spend 40 to 60 percent more on public
welfare and the authors argue that this is due to higher elite capture under the assembly system.
The fact that early 20th century Sweden was a rural society, and that voting in assemblies (in
contrast to elections) was typically not anonymous, likely facilitated capture by elites. Introducing
secret ballots has also been shown to reduce elite capture in other rural settings. In Chile, for
example, the de facto control over voters by landlords was a key argument for introducing secret
ballots in rural elections (Baland and Robinson, 2008). Similar elite capture has been documented
in citizen assemblies in Indonesia (Olken, 2010) and Afghanistan (Beath et al., 2017). The authors
3Analogous results have also been documented for the U.S. (Figlio and Fletcher, 2012; Bertocchi et al. 2017). In
a similar vein, Carruthers and Wanamaker (2015) summarize mostly U.S. evidence on womens greater preference
for both private and public goods and services that enhance child welfare. While less relevant for us, the link
between gender and preferences for education spending is less clear-cut in developing countries (Chattopadhyay
and Duo, 2004).
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compare the types of projects chosen under citizen assemblies and secret ballot referenda and show
that referenda tend to diminish the inuence of elites on chosen projects (more clearly so in Beath
et al.).
Even though voting in Swiss assembly meetings is typically not anonymous, the type of narrow
elite capture described in the studies above is unlikely to explain our results. First, we nd no
e¤ect on welfare spending, which is inconsistent with elites holding back this kind of spending
under the assembly system. Second, by 1945 Switzerland already was a highly industrialized
country. Particularly in our switcher sample communes, agriculture was practically inexistent
according to the 1950 census. Since factory owners likely had less control over their workers than
landlords over their tenants (Baland and Robinson, 2008), elite capture of assembly decisions
seems less plausible compared to more rural settings. Third, elite capture was never mentioned as
a reason for introducing a parliament among our switcher communes. Fourth, the rich and highly
educated are if anything under-represented in assemblies according to the 2009 Ladner survey
of commune secretaries. Last but not least, using recent post-election survey data (SELECTS,
2011), we document that while the rich are slightly less favorable to higher welfare spending in
Switzerland, they are actually slightly more favorable to public provision of childcare than the not-
so-rich. Similarly, the more highly educated actually prefer higher public spending on education
(Cattaneo and Wolter, 2009). As such, if the elite were capturing the process in assemblies,
introducing a parliament should reduce education spending - the opposite of what we nd.
A more recent paper from a developed country setting compares aggregate budgetary outcomes
of assembly and representative democracies for very small communes in Spain. Sanz (forthcoming)
employs a regression discontinuity design with population cuto¤at 100 and quite convincingly deals
with the fact that the density of the population distribution is discontinuous at the cuto¤. His
results suggest that representative democracy increases total spending by about 8 percent, which is
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quantitatively close to what we nd. Our paper goes further by decomposing the spending increase
and by providing the rst direct evidence of systematic demographic di¤erences between assembly
participants, voters and the electorate at large, which plausibly explain observed di¤erences in
local public budget choices.
Our paper is also related to an earlier literature that shows how adding elements of direct
democracy (voter initiative and budget referendum) within representative systems reduces gov-
ernment spending (e.g. Feld and Matsusaka, 2003; Funk and Gathmann, 2011). In contrast to
our comparison between assembly and parliament, this literature looks at cantons or states under
parliamentary systems but varying degrees of direct democratic instruments. More recent studies,
such as Hainmueller and Hangartner (2019), focus on more specic questions, such as whether
direct democracy a¤ects immigrant naturalization decisions.
More broadly, our paper contributes to a large literature relating institutional reforms, such
as su¤rage extensions or compulsory voting laws, to policies. For instance, Aidt et al. (2006)
document how lifting socio-economic restrictions on the right to vote contributed to economic
growth in Europe, while Miller (2008) shows how granting females the right to vote in the U.S.
contributed to a decrease in child mortality. Ho¤man et al. (2017) show that while making voting
compulsory increased election turnout in Austria, the level and composition of public spending
remained una¤ected. In addition to these papers, which analyze changes in de jure power or legal
requirements, there are contributions studying changes in de facto power. For instance, poor voters
were e¤ectively enfranchised when poll taxes and literacy tests were abolished in the U.S. (Husted
and Kenny, 1997), or when Brazil switched from paper ballot voting to electronic voting (Fujiwara,
2015). Our paper is more closely related to this last strand of papers, even though the context is
entirely di¤erent. We show that the citizen assembly may lead to under-representation of certain
groups, which in turn a¤ects their de facto power in the political decision-making process.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents institutional background on the Swiss
federal system. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses identifying assumptions and the
estimation approach for our event study. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 discusses
robustness checks. Section 7 provides available evidence on mechanisms. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Communal autonomy
Switzerland is a federal state with three layers of government: the federal level, the cantonal
level, and the commune level. Political responsibilities remain with the cantons unless they were
granted to the federal government in a national referendum. As a consequence, cantons have a lot
of autonomy in the provision of public goods and the choice of political institutions. The degree of
commune autonomy is regulated by cantonal laws, which leads to substantial heterogeneity across
cantons. For instance, some cantons mandate political institutions at the commune level, while
other cantons let the communes choose freely.
For our switcher sample analysis we focus on the fourteen cantons that allow local choice of
the legislative institution.4 We exclude communes from canton Ticino, since most of the local
institutional variation was generated by commune mergers. Some cantons, such as Neuchâtel and
Geneva, prescribe a parliament for all communes, while other cantons mandate that legislative
decisions at the local level be made at the assembly or at the ballot box (cantons Appenzell In-
nerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Glarus, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, Uri). Canton Vaud
prescribes a parliament for communes with more than 800 inhabitants and allows local choice be-
tween parliament and assembly for communes with up to 800 inhabitants.5 Population thresholds
4In all but one canton (Scha¤hausen) there were actual switches of legislative institutions during our sample
period.
5The resulting fuzzy regression discontinuity analysis is unfortunately underpowered. Please see our earlier
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also exist for communes in cantons Fribourg, Vallis and Zürich, which are included in our switcher
sample analysis. The number of communes around these cuto¤s is small and the assignment rule
sometimes di¤ers, mandating an assembly below the cuto¤ and allowing choice above.
2.2 Commune responsibilities
In addition to the heterogeneity in communal autonomy across cantons, the distribution of respon-
sibilities for communal and cantonal public service provision also di¤ers across cantons. Typically,
however, commune responsibilities include preschool and primary education (grades 1 through 5
or 6), welfare, law enforcement, and tra¢ c, among others. For the medium-sized communes in
our switcher sample, responsibilities typically also include lower secondary education (grades 6
or 7 through 9). The bulk of communal spending is on education, welfare, tra¢ c and general
administration as shown in Table 1. Communal budgets need not be balanced every period. As
for total communal spending relative to cantonal and federal spending, communes undertook 24%
of total spending, cantons 42%, and the federal level the remaining 34% in 2010. A large share of
local expenditures is nanced through a local income tax.
2.3 Commune organization and political rights
Decision-making bodies at local level include the executive (usually called Gemeinderat), the leg-
islative, organized as either assembly or parliament, the electorate, and special committees for
example for nancial a¤airs. The exact division of powers in the budget process varies across
communes but typically it is characterized as follows. The executive implements approved expen-
ditures and drafts the budget proposal in consultation with the nance committee. The legislative
votes on the budget proposal and controls the execution of past expenditures. Participants at
working paper for details.
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assemblies can propose budgetary items for deliberation. Budgetary decisions are taken by simple
majority in an open vote, except if a secret vote is requested and approved. Under both legislative
forms, the nal say on the budget may rest with the electorate, either through mandatory or
facultative referendum - that is, when a su¢ cient number of citizens ask for a vote at the ballot
box.
3 Data
3.1 The switcher sample
To gather information on the institutional history of Switzerlands 1,821 communes in cantons
granting autonomy over the choice of local legislative form, we designed our own legislative survey
and sent it to municipal secretaries in April 2011. We then combined information from our
own survey with several prior surveys conducted by Prof. Ladner and his team, as well as with
administrative information on local parliaments from four cantons. Based on these three data
sources, we identied 77 communes that had changed the form of their legislative power between
1945 and 2010, mostly abandoning the citizen assembly in favor of introducing a parliament. To
the best of our knowledge these 77 communes represent the universe of switchers over this period
(see the online appendix for details). As shown in Figure 1 below, the switcher sample is spread out
all over Switzerland. Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity in the time of institutional
change across communes as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
What were the main reasons for the system change? According to municipal secretaries in
the switcher sample (response rate 56%), the key rationale for introducing a parliament was low
turnout at assemblies, coupled with potentially unrepresentative decisions.6 Especially in large
6See also Ladner (2016) for more recent examples and discussion.
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communes, turnout in assemblies was very low (often less than 10 percent), which raised concerns
about representation. Space problems (due to population growth or the introduction of women
su¤rage) were another frequently mentioned argument. In our empirical analysis we therefore
control for population size and women su¤rage. About one third of commune secretaries also
cited the desire to professionalize the legislative process as a reason for switching to a parliament.
Frequent arguments against having a parliament were a potentially stronger inuence of political
parties and lobbyists as well as higher costs and di¢ culties to nd candidates. Importantly, none
of the commune secretaries related the choice of legislative form to specic budget components.
3.2 Local budgetary data for the switcher sample
In our switcher sample we collected historical data on total revenue and total expenditure, as well
as expenditures broken down by spending category. Accounting systems varied across cantons
and time, and even slightly within cantons. We coded every change in the communes accounting
system and control for these structural breaks using dummy variables in the regressions. Details are
in the online appendix. Table 1 below presents summary statistics. Total revenue and spending in
the switcher sample were about 3,700 Swiss Francs per capita on average from 1945 to 2010.7 The
most common categories include administrative, education, welfare, law enforcement and tra¢ c
and environment spending. Together, these account for about two-thirds of total spending. Other
spending categories, such as health, economy, or nances, were less common at the commune level
during our sample period.
7The maximum spending and revenue of about 30,000 Swiss Francs per capita seem unrealistically high compared
to the second-highest spending level of 19,000 Swiss Francs per capita. The corresponding year is also an outlier
within the commune itself and thus likely reects a one-time revenue windfall.
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3.3 Control variables
Most control variables (commune population, demographic structure, labor force participation
rate, and share foreigners) are from the Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ ce (Bundesamt für Statistik).
We interpolate control variables between census years, except for commune population which is
based on yearly administrative data between 1981 and 2010. Another key control variable is the
indicator for local woman su¤rage, which is from our legislative survey. As shown in Table 1,
switcher communes tend to be medium-sized (about 8,500 inhabitants on average) with a labor
force participation rate of about 62 percent and a share of foreigners of about 15 percent on
average.
4 Identication and estimation approach
Let Yct denote spending per capita in a given category or overall in commune c and period t, Dct
the indicator for parliament (1) or assembly (0),  the (constant) e¤ect of parliament relative
to assembly, Xct a vector of time-varying covariates including commune population, demographic
controls (share of population in age brackets 20-39, 40-64, 65 and above), labor force participation
rate, share foreigners and the indicator for woman su¤rage, c commune xed e¤ects, t time xed
e¤ects, and Uct the inuence of unobserved additional factors that a¤ect outcomes. The baseline
specication is as follows:
ln(Yct) = Dct + Xct + c + t + Uct: (1)
Causal interpretation of xed e¤ects estimates hinges on the assumption that time-varying un-
observables are uncorrelated with parliament adoption, conditional on the commune and time
xed e¤ects and time-varying controls. We control for population and local women su¤rage since
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these were mentioned as key reasons for parliament adoption in our survey. Similarly, whether the
electorate includes women or consists only of men is an important determinant of public spending
(Miller, 2008). We also control for commune demographics since the age prole of the population is
a potential determinant of public spending priorities, as are labor force participation and the share
foreigners in the commune. We do not include controls for tax rates or political competition since
these might be a¤ected by parliament adoption. For example, tax rates may well have increased to
nance a spending increase under the representative system. Similarly, party politics may have be-
come more important and elections more competitive because of the switch to parliament. Rather
than being confounders, including such potentially bad controls would lead to biased estimates of
parliament adoption. Our second specication additionally controls for commune-specic linear
trends ct. The third specication in addition controls for commune-specic breaks in the local
accounting system.
We also conduct an event study in order to assess the validity of the research design. Let
Ec denote the year commune c switched for the rst time from assembly to parliament between
1945 and 2010. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, all communes except for two started out with an
assembly and switched to parliament at least once during this period. 12 communes switched
back to assembly after a few years. Dene time from parliament adoption in commune c as
Kct = t Ec, and let Dkct = IfKct = kg denote a dummy variable equal to 1 for the kth year from
parliament adoption and zero otherwise. We look at 8 years prior and 8 years post-adoption so
k runs from -8 to 8 and we include a dummy for 9 or more years prior to adoption and another
dummy for 9 or more years post-adoption. Focusing on a 16-year window around adoption ensures
that the coe¢ cients are identied from a similar set of communes. Expanding the pre- or post-
adoption periods would lead to shifting sample compositions as some communes transitioned to
parliament less than 8 years into the sample period while others transitioned too late (see Figure 2
13
in the online appendix for the distribution of years from the switch to parliament in our sample).
Moreover, 12 communes switched back to the assembly form after a few years under parliament
as shown in Figures 2 and 3. The omitted base category is the year prior to parliament adoption
so that coe¢ cients on the time from adoption dummies reect di¤erences compared to the year
prior to adoption. Our main event study specication also includes the time-varying controls,
commune-specic trends, and structural break dummies as above. Results without these controls
are quantitatively similar but less precise as shown in our online appendix. The event study model
is then as follows:
ln(Yct) =
X
k
kD
k
ct + Xct + c + t + ct+ Uct; (2)
Dkct =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
IfKct  kg k   9
IfKct = kg  8  k  8
IfKct  kg k  9
: (3)
Intuitively, introducing a parliament in the future should probably not a¤ect spending today
and thus large and signicant pre-adoption e¤ects might signal that parliament adoption is en-
dogenous. For example, a remaining unobserved confounder could be local wages or local income
more generally, since the local income tax contributes substantially to local government revenues.
Moreover, an increase in local wages might make time-consuming assembly meetings less attractive
and thus lead to an increased likelihood of parliament adoption. Under this scenario, a gradual
increase in wages should manifest itself already prior to parliament adoption. On the other hand,
no impact of parliament on spending in the pre-adoption period but fairly rapid and persistent
impacts after adoption would support a causal interpretation of the event study estimates.
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5 Main results
Table 2 shows estimation results for total spending and the most common spending categories.
Each panel shows three impact estimates, corresponding to specications with time and commune
xed e¤ects and time-varying controls, additional commune-specic linear trends, and additional
dummies for structural breaks in the local accounting system. Results in panel A show that having
a parliament increases total spending per capita by about 7 percent compared to an assembly. This
e¤ect is signicant at 10 percent even with commune-specic linear trends and when controlling
for accounting system changes. Importantly, the R-squared reaches 91 percent, leaving little room
for omitted variable bias. Total revenue also increases by about 7 percent (results available on
request). Unfortunately we did not collect data on revenue composition and thus are unable to
pinpoint which revenue categories increased.
Turning to the decomposition of the spending increase, panels B and C of Table 2 show that
the parliament system increases administrative spending and education spending per capita by
about 12 to 13 percent in the most demanding specication with commune-specic time trends
and structural break dummies. Impact estimates for welfare, law enforcement, and tra¢ c and
environment spending, shown in panels D through F respectively, are small and statistically not
signicant. Similarly, estimates for other spending are also generally small and not signicant
(results available on request).
Figure 4 plots event study impact estimates for spending per capita and 95 percent condence
interval bars from 8 years prior to adoption until 8 years post-adoption based on equation (2).
Panels A through C display estimated impacts on total, administrative and education spending per
capita, respectively. The three panels show a pattern of pre-adoption e¤ects that bounce around
zero, followed by a sharp and persistent increase of the e¤ect estimate at the time of parliament
adoption. For total spending, the post-adoption estimates average about 6 percent and they are
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not signicantly di¤erent from zero due to the disaggregation. Since the post-adoption e¤ect
estimates show little variability, the corresponding pooled estimates from panel A in Table 2 are
appropriate and these are signicant at 10 percent. For administrative and education spending
shown in panels B and C respectively, the post-adoption estimates average about 13 and 15 percent,
exhibit little variability, and are mostly statistically di¤erent from zero even at 5 percent.
In contrast, event study estimates for welfare, law enforcement, and tra¢ c and environment
spending shown in panels D through F exhibit no clear pattern around the time of parliament
adoption and are statistically not signicant almost without exception. For example, while e¤ect
estimates for welfare spending in the post-adoption period average about 10 percent, similar-sized
"impacts" are already present several years prior to adoption as shown in panel D of Figure 4.
Event study estimates for other spending categories also look similar and are available on request.
Overall, the econometric evidence suggests that adopting a parliament increases total spending
per capita by about 6 percent and that this increase is mostly driven by administrative and educa-
tion spending. Indeed, since administrative spending accounts for about 10 percent of the budget,
while education accounts for about 20 percent as shown in Table 1, together these categories
account for a total spending increase of about 0:1 0:13 + 0:2 0:15 = 4:3 percent.
6 Robustness checks
6.1 Referendum rights
The switch from citizen assembly to parliament entails a delegation of legislative powers to elected
o¢ cials. In order to counterbalance this delegation, some communes introduced a compulsory
referendum on substantial nancial matters, leaving the nal decision to voters at the ballot
box. Other communes, however, did not introduce additional referendum rights or already had
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them in place under the assembly system (and kept them even after the switch to parliament).
We run separate regressions for those switches of legislative form that held compulsory nancial
referendum rights constant and those that were accompanied by an introduction of such rights.
Table 3 reports the results. While splitting the sample leads to a loss of precision, impacts on
total, administrative and education spending are of similar magnitudes as in Table 2 even when
the switch in legislative form involved no change of referendum rights (panels A, B and C). For
switches involving a change in referendum rights, there are also similar-sized impacts on total and
administrative spending and an attenuated estimate for education spending (panels D, E and F).
6.2 Political and school mergers
Over the course of our sample period, ten of the switcher communes experienced at least one
merger with another commune. Even though the e¤ect of a merger on spending per capita and
spending composition is theoretically ambiguous, it could lead to a spurious correlation if the
merger were also correlated with parliament adoption. But since in all cases except one the
merger involved a much larger commune absorbing a smaller one (technically an amalgamation),
it is a priori unlikely that the merger itself induced a change of legislative form. In another six
switcher communes, previously autonomous school communities were integrated into the political
commune. Such school community mergers would mechanically increase overall and education
spending per capita of the political commune after the merger and lead to biased estimates if
correlated with parliament adoption. We address these concerns by including separate dummy
variables that switch to one for all periods after a political or school community merger. Table 4
shows that the magnitude and precision of nearly all estimates are quantitatively invariant to the
inclusion of these additional controls.8
8When we drop the communes involved in a political merger from the sample, results remain quantitatively
unchanged in terms of both magnitude and precision. When we drop those experiencing a school community
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6.3 Women su¤rage
Womens right to vote in local a¤airs was introduced gradually during our sample period. In some
cases, commune secretaries cited space problems associated with doubling the size of the electorate
as reasons for switching from assembly to parliament. All our regressions therefore control for a
women su¤rage dummy. However, if increased women representation under parliament is indeed
driving the observed increase in education spending, we should observe a similar increase when
women get the right to vote irrespective of the legislative form. Table 2 in the online appendix
shows that this is indeed the case. Women su¤rage increases both total spending and education
spending per capita by about 10 percent. The evidence on women su¤rage is thus very much in
line with increased female representation under the parliament system at least partially driving
changes in budget priorities.
6.4 Placebo reform and randomization inference
A hypothetical switch from citizen assembly to parliament 10 years prior to the actual switch
should not have any e¤ect on budget outcomes. We implement this falsication test by restricting
the sample to assembly periods and replacing the parliament dummy with a placebo dummy that
switches from zero to one 10 years before actual parliament adoption. Then we run the exact
same regressions as we did in the full sample with the actual switch to parliament. Table 3 in the
online appendix shows small and insignicant estimates for 5 out of our 6 main spending outcomes
(welfare spending being the exception). As an additional robustness check, we create a dataset
with fake parliament adoptions - one switch from assembly to parliament per commune as in most
of our switcher sample - at random points in time between 1945 and 2010. We then use the recent
Stata command "ritest" to conduct randomization inference by drawing on these fake parliament
merger, the e¤ect estimates again remain similar but become insignicant for total and education spending.
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adoptions to estimate our baseline specication equation (1). We run 2000 replications. None of
the placebo estimates are larger than the respective actual estimates for total, administrative, and
education spending per capita (p-values=0.000).
6.5 Time-varying controls and functional form
Figure 3 in the online appendix plots event study estimates from a specication that only controls
for commune and time xed e¤ects. The patterns of estimates are quantitatively similar to those
in Figure 4 in the paper but less precise, suggesting that potentially endogenous time-varying
controls are not driving our results. Similarly, Table 4 in the online appendix shows that the
pooled estimates do not vary much when time-varying covariates are added one by one. Figure 4
in the online appendix shows that the results are also robust when the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of spending (instead of spending per capita). When spending is in per capita
terms or raw (without logs), results are still qualitatively similar but substantially more noisy
(online appendix Figures 5 and 6, respectively).
7 Mechanisms
7.1 Political participation in assemblies and elections
One key di¤erence between assembly and representative democracy is the level of political partic-
ipation or turnout. Indeed, our leading hypothesis is that turnout increases when parliamentary
elections are introduced, which in turn may alter the identity and preferences of the pivotal voter.
Ideally, we would therefore like to provide direct evidence on political participation from our
switcher sample at di¤erent points in time. Unfortunately however, there are no historical data on
turnout in assemblies or in local legislative elections. We draw instead on a recent country-wide
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survey of commune secretaries (Ladner 2009) that inquired about patterns of participation in as-
semblies and local executive elections. Figure 5 documents that turnout in communal executive
elections is indeed an order of magnitude higher than participation in assemblies.9 While turnout
is only available for local executive - not legislative - elections, we veried for recent elections
in our switcher sample that local executive and legislative turnout are highly correlated (see on-
line appendix Figure 1). We therefore think it is reasonable to assume that similar participation
patterns also characterized earlier periods.
7.2 Characteristics of assembly participants
In order to understand whether assembly participants di¤er from voters in elections and from the
electorate at large, we conducted our own survey in canton Zürich communes during the fall of
2016. Out of the 154 communes in canton Zürich with a citizen assembly, 62 agreed to participate in
the survey. We decided to gather assembly participantscharacteristics at the budgetassembly,
which is when the upcoming years budget is decided. At the start of the assembly, the commune
secretary explained to participants that the survey was part of a study nanced by the Swiss
national science foundation investigating the functioning of citizen assemblies. The secretary also
encouraged assembly participants to ll out the survey, explaining that anonymity was guaranteed
and that the survey would take less than ve minutes to ll out. The survey itself consisted of
two pages and asked about gender, age, family status, education and labor market status. 3,574
assembly participants lled out the survey. The secretary counted the total number of assembly
participants so that we could assess the response rate, which was 66 percent on average across
communes. As a robustness check, we also consider only communes with a response rate larger
9A few communes appear to have zero election turnout, which seems unlikely. We checked that these zeros are
not due to coding errors. Perhaps they are due to approximations given by the commune secretaries responding to
the survey.
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than 70 percent.
7.3 Electorate characteristics
From the statistical o¢ ce of canton Zürich we obtained information on the set of individuals
eligible to vote (Swiss citizens, aged 18 years and above) in each commune. Data on age are
administrative and cover the entire population of the canton, while data on education, family
structure and hours worked are collected as part of an annual survey (Strukturerhebung) run
jointly by the federal government and cantonal authorities.10 We aggregate each variable across
all individuals living in the 62 communes that participated in our assembly survey.
7.4 Voter characteristics
Local parliament elections take place every four years and voting is either done by mail or at
the ballot box. Because there are no commune-level surveys of voter characteristics, we rely on
post-national-election surveys (SELECTS) that are representative at the cantonal, not local level.
Respondents were contacted in the weeks following an election and were asked about their gender,
age, education, income, and civil status.11 We combine the 2011 and 2015 survey rounds to
obtain a total sample of 1,127 respondents from canton Zürich who participated in the respective
preceding national elections.
One natural question is whether voters in national elections di¤er from voters in cantonal
or local elections. To address this concern, we exploit an earlier post-national-election survey
from 2007 that asked about participation in both federal and cantonal elections. Turnout was
only three percentage points lower in cantonal elections compared to federal elections (63 percent
10See https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bevoelkerung/erhebungen/se.html for further infor-
mation.
11A description of the surveys and all the data can be found here: http://forscenter.ch/en/our-surveys/selects/.
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versus 66 percent). Unsurprisingly, the characteristics of voters in federal and cantonal elections in
terms of age, gender, education and income were almost identical. Similarly, even though turnout
in local elections tends to be even lower (about 41 percent in our switcher sample), an even
earlier survey from 2003 asked about respondentsinterest in local and cantonal politics on a scale
from one to four. Among voters in cantonal elections, average interest in local politics was 2.88,
while for cantonal politics it was 2.86. It therefore seems reasonable to expect socio-demographic
characteristics of voters in cantonal and local elections to be similar.
7.5 Comparison of characteristics
Panel A of Figure 6 documents that assembly participants are substantially older than the elec-
torate in canton Zürich communes that took part in our assembly survey. As is evident from
that gure, 20- to 40-year-olds are particularly under-represented in those communes. While the
average Swiss citizen is 50.9 years old, average age of assembly participants is 57.1. Panel B of
Figure 6 shows that 20- to 40-year-olds are under-represented in assemblies also compared to can-
ton Zürich voters who participated in national elections (the average voter is 52.8 years old). The
age distribution of assembly participants is also statistically di¤erent from the age distributions
of the electorate and of voters (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values=0.000).
In addition, Panel A of Figure 7 shows that women are under-represented in assemblies com-
pared to their proportion in the electorate in the set of communes that participated in our assembly
survey. While the proportion of females among Swiss citizens is about 0.51, the proportion of fe-
male assembly participants is only 0.40. Similarly, Panel B of Figure 7 shows that women are also
under-represented in assemblies when compared to canton Zürich voters in national elections in
which about 48 percent are female. The proportion of women in assemblies is also statistically
di¤erent from the proportion of women in the electorate or among voters (p-values=0.000). Fig-
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ures 7 and 8 in the online appendix show that these age and gender distribution di¤erences are
robust to restricting the sample to communes with an assembly survey response rate above 70
percent. Results for other characteristics are less clear-cut. For example, Figure 9 in the online
appendix shows that while average education is similar among assembly participants and canton
Zürich voters in national elections, the variance is higher among assembly participants.
A natural concern is whether these results generalize beyond canton Zürich. We again take
advantage of the 2009 Ladner survey of commune secretaries, who were asked about their sub-
jective opinion regarding which groups of people are over- or under-represented at assemblies in
their commune. Reassuringly, Figure 8 shows that commune secretaries tend to view women and
especially young people as being under-represented at assemblies. Similarly, the rich and highly
educated are if anything under-represented in assemblies, which goes counter to the idea of reduced
elite capture under parliament driving increased education spending.
7.6 Policy preferences
The above results document sizeable di¤erences in terms of age and gender between assembly
participants, voters, and the electorate at large. In order to assess whether policy preferences
di¤er by age and gender, we rely again on a post-election survey from 2011, which is representative
at the cantonal level. We consider all respondents, irrespective of whether they participated
in the election or not. One of the key questions in the survey asks whether it should be the
responsibility of the state to provide a¤ordable childcare for parents who would like to combine
work and family. Childcare provision is primarily a commune responsibility. The survey also
asks whether respondents are in favor of higher or lower government spending on several items,
including welfare benets and police and law enforcement. While welfare benets are again mainly
provided by local governments, police and law enforcement tend to be provided by both commune
23
and cantonal authorities (Rüthli, 2012).
Panel A of Figure 9 shows that women are 10 percentage points more likely to favor local
public childcare provision than men. Moreover, Panel D documents that Swiss 20- to 40-year-olds
are 15 percentage points more likely to be in favor of local public childcare provision than older
citizens. These age and gender di¤erences in policy preferences are not only economically but
also statistically signicant (p-values=0.000). Similarly, results from another survey by Cattaneo
and Wolter (2009) conrm that elderly people in Switzerland are less supportive of education
spending more generally. Switching from citizen assembly to parliament in our setting therefore
seems to increase the representation of two demographics with relatively strong preferences for
public spending on education. At the same time, relatively young citizens and women are not
more favorable to increased spending on welfare and law enforcement than older citizens and men,
as shown in Panels B, C, E, and F of Figure 9. Our ndings that parliament adoption increases
spending on education - but not on law enforcement or welfare spending - are thus remarkably
consistent with the evidence on policy preferences of under-represented groups in assemblies.
8 Conclusion
This paper empirically investigates whether the choice of legislative institution matters for the
level and composition of local government spending in Switzerland. We nd that for medium-
sized communes that all switched their legislative form at least once between 1945 and 2010,
introducing a parliament increases total spending per capita by about 6 percent. The spending
increase is mostly driven by general administration and education spending. While rent seeking
and the cost of running a parliament can explain the increase in administrative spending, they are
unlikely to account for the increase in education spending. A more likely mechanism is a change
in the identity and preferences of the pivotal voter. Legislative elections (compared to assemblies)
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increase the representation of relatively young citizens and women, two groups that tend to be
relatively favorable to public spending on education. Overall, these results suggest that the form of
the local legislative institution matters for budget allocation and that the benets of direct citizen
participation may come at the cost of selective representation. Future research might therefore
investigate ways to give under-represented groups more voice in the assembly decision-making
process.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the switcher sample
Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Form of the local legislative power (authors' data collection)
Parliament (1), Assembly (0) 5,082 0.506 0.500 0 1
Local budgetary data (authors' data collection)
Total revenue per capita 4,762 3,702 2,562 134 30,273
Total spending per capita 4,790 3,659 2,520 164 30,273
Administrative spending per capita 4,797 370 287 16 2,620
Welfare spending per capita 4,285 437 495 0 3,543
Law enforcement spending per capita 4,329 149 126 0 1,234
Education spending per capita 4,502 755 507 3 2,848
Health spending per capita 3,400 150 151 0 1,056
Traffic and environment spending per capita 4,680 632 650 0 7,587
Control variables (Bundesamt für Statistik)
Resident population 5,082 8,532 6,052 404 29,006
Labor force participation rate  (%) 5,082 61.8 4.6 46.5 79.1
Share of 0- to 19-year-olds (%) 5,082 28.8 6.1 14.9 45.7
Share of 20- to 39-year-olds (%) 5,082 30.5 4.2 13.9 53.0
Share of 40- to 64-year-olds (%) 5,082 28.9 3.9 16.9 45.5
Share of at least 65-year-olds (%) 5,082 11.8 4.4 2.7 30.0
Share foreigners (%) 5,082 15.4 9.5 0 53.8
Woman suffrage 5,082 0.617 0.486 0 1
Notes: The unit of observation is a commune-year. There are 77 switcher communes and the sample period
ranges from 1945 to 2010. Budgetary data are in year 2010 Swiss Francs based on the consumer price index.
Control variables are from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (Bundesamt für Statistik), except for the woman
suffrage indicator, which is from our legislative survey. Resident population is based on administrative data from
1981 to 2010 and interpolated from census data between 1945 and 1980. The other control variables are
interpolated based on census data.
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Figure 6: Age of assembly participants, the electorate and voters
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich communes that took part in our 2016 assembly
survey. Assembly participants responded to our survey. The electorate corresponds to Swiss
citizens and is based on register data collected by the statistical office of canton Zürich.
Panel A: Assembly vs. Electorate
0
1
2
3
Pe
rc
en
t
20 40 60 80 100
Respondent age
Assembly participants Voters in national elections
Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich. Assembly participants are from those communes
that took part in our 2016 assembly survey. Voters in national elections participated in the Swiss
Electoral Studies surveys of 2011 or 2015 and are from the entire canton.
Panel B: Assembly vs. Voters in Elections
39
Figure 7: Gender of assembly participants, the electorate and voters
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